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Abstract 
The literature on family firm performance has failed to conclusively link the impact of family 
influence on the financial market performance of public firms. The goal of this research is to 
address this gap by considering mechanisms through which founding family influence contributes 
to superior firm performance relative to non-family firms. This study links family influence in 
publicly-traded firms with firm performance in terms of both accounting (Return on Assets) and 
financial market (Buy-and-Hold-Abnormal-Returns) metrics. The findings support the argument 
that increased advertising and R&D focus in family influenced firms reflects a long-term oriented 
management strategy, consistent with decreased agency costs. Using a large cross-sectional-time-
series sample of publicly traded firms for the period between 2001 and 2010 from 65 different 
industries, the findings in this article suggest that investments in advertising and R&D projects 
have better performance implications in family-owned vs. non-family owned firms. The results 
are robust to alternative models, measures of firm performance, industry, firm, and time effects.  
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Introduction 
Founding family ownership, (and consecutively family influence) in public firms has been linked 
to both positive and negative performance consequences in publicly traded firms. Agency theory 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) suggests that the founding family’s continued presence, combined with a large 
equity ownership position, longer investment horizons, and specialized knowledge of the firm and 
of product markets, may significantly lower the classic agency problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) 
between management and owners and thereby boost firm performance in even non-family-
majority owned firms (Maury, 2006), through easier monitoring and control over managerial 
actions (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; James, 1999; Lee, 2004; Stein, 1988). Conversely, negative 
performance implications of this ownership structure are equally plausible, as ownership by 
founding families is often associated with significant disadvantages: inefficient utilization of 
company resources, extraction of private benefits at the expense of the firm and other shareholder 
groups, managerial entrenchment and battles for control (Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, 
Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007; Holderness & Sheehan, 1988; Morck, Stangeland, & Yeung., 
2000; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Consequently, the empirical findings in the literature regarding 
the implications of family influence on the performance of firms with significant founding family 
ownership have been inconclusive, despite the plethora of studies purporting to test this linkage. 
(Carney, Van Essen, Gedajlovic, & Heugens, 2013; Chrisman, Chua, & Sharma, 2005; Miller, Le 
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Breton-Miller, Lester, & Cannella, 2007; O’Boyle, Pollack, & Rutherford, 2012; Villalonga & 
Amit, 2006). 
 
The mixed nature of prior empirical research findings, combined with the equally plausible 
theoretical reasoning behind both the positive and the negative potential impact of family influence 
on firm performance indicate the presence of contingencies which have not been investigated. For 
example, with some exceptions (Gallucci, Santulli, & Calabro, 2015), the mechanisms of the 
founding family’s impact have not been fully investigated to include firm specific strategic 
investments in value creation and value appropriation activities (Mizik & Jacobson, 2003) such as 
R&D and advertising investments, and how those investments differ in the context of the family 
influenced firm compared to its non-family competitors. In addition, prior research has highlighted 
the role of firm strategy in successful family firms as “quite different” from the traditionally more 
studied non-family firms’ strategies (Chrisman et al., 2005; Sharma, Chrisman & Chua, 1997), 
providing more theoretical reasoning to study the performance differences of family vs. non-family 
public firms. Indeed, strategy in family businesses has been woefully understudied (Ibrahim, 
Angelidis, & Parsa, 2008; Zahra and Sharma, 2004) and represents a viable area of research.   
 
Investments in R&D and advertising projects play a key role in stimulating value creation and the 
subsequent appropriation of the economic benefits for the innovating firm (Mizik & Jacobson, 
2003). In the case of family influenced firms, however, it is likely that such investments may be 
affected by the different set of agency problems that are characteristic to such entities (Morck & 
Yeung, 2003). A chief concern is that management may act in favor of the influential family 
owners, at the expense of the shareholders in general, and at the extreme, maybe reluctant to invest 
in R&D projects and advertising campaigns (Morck et al., 2000). Furthermore, firms that make 
insufficient investments in R&D and advertising become less able to exploit market opportunities 
(McGrath & Nerkar, 2004) and consequently may suffer low firm performance. However, an 
alternative argument stipulates that family influence in firms should be associated with higher firm 
value and performance due to the alignment of the interests of owners and management through 
the decrease of agency problems in such firms and the encouragement of investments in longer-
term oriented R&D projects to develop new products (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Tribo, Berrone, 
& Surroca, 2007). Certain marketing investments such as brand building, customer loyalty and 
satisfaction initiatives also benefit from taking a long-term investment perspective (Srivastava, 
Shervani, & Fahey, 1998) and therefore should be affected by family ownership in a similar way 
as R&D investments. Therefore, this research investigates the moderating effect of advertising and 
R&D spending on the relationship between family firm ownership and performance.  
 
The above arguments are tested using a large sample, multi-industry, multi-time period study 
context of firms that exhibit family ownership characteristics and represent 53 diverse industries 
for the period from 2001 to 2010. The findings suggest that family ownership is associated with 
increased accounting and financial market performance, contingent on increased marketing 
(advertising) and innovation (R&D) investments. These results are further bolstered by controlling 
for other considerations which may also affect firm performance, such as the presence of large 
institutional shareholders, firm size and leverage. The results are statistically and economically 
significant and are robust to different modeling methods, endogeneity, multicollinearity, 
heteroscedasticity, as well as survivorship bias.  
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This article makes several contributions to theory and practice. First, it extends the understanding 
and use of agency theory within the framework of family business research. In doing so, it supports 
the notion that family ownership represents a viable corporate ownership structure, as it is likely 
to reduce the classic agency problem (Fama & Jensen, 1983) between shareholders and 
management. Second, it adds to the developing debate on the need to identify key strategic 
considerations which impact the performance of family owned firms (Astrachan, 2010), by 
showing that the managerial view of R&D and advertising investments may be a key 
differentiating factor between family and non-family firms. Finally, this article has implications 
for the owners and managers of family firms, as the findings suggest that the proper utilization of 
advertising and R&D investments might bring about increased accounting and financial market 
performance, representing a unique resource, which may be deemed a “family ownership 
premium.” Family firms may just be positioned to take better advantage of the same level of 
investments in R&D and advertising projects than their non-family owned peers are, due to the 
reduction of agency costs, and the overall different managerial environment inside the firm.  
 
The remainder of this article consists of a literature review on the relationship between family 
ownership and firm performance, followed by hypotheses development, methods and results, 
discussion of findings, limitations, and concluding remarks.  
 
Literature Review 
Overall, family controlled firms are responsible for the creation of the majority of the world’s 
wealth, as these businesses are estimated to contribute between 70-90% of the world’s GDP 
(Tharawat Magazine, 2014). Furthermore, family owned businesses contribute 57% of the U.S. 
GDP, and employ over 63% of the workforce (Family Enterprise USA, 2011), and are responsible 
for 78% of all new job creation (Astrachan & Shanker, 2003). Founding-family firm ownership 
represents a common ownership structure that exists in publicly traded companies as well: over 
33% of Fortune 500 firms had equity owned by founding families (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Furthermore, recent studies highlight the widespread nature of this type 
of corporate structure across the world (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; La Porta, López de 
Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999) and claim that this form of corporate equity ownership is at least as 
common as widely-held and other non-family forms of ownership: For example, Faccio and Lang 
(2002) document that 44.29% of the public firms included in their study of Western European 
economies were family controlled. The importance of founding family ownership in public firms 
also stems from the fact that family ownership is the prevalent form of corporate ownership in 
private corporations (over 90% in most industries), and therefore the residual ownership by the 
founding families post IPO (initial public offering, i.e. the process via which firms become 
publically traded) represents further commitment by the company’s founders to the future 
wellbeing of the now public firm (James, 1999). Furthermore, families also have control over 
almost 20% of all board seats, and are represented across a broad swathe of industries in the U.S. 
as well as abroad (Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003).  
 
Despite the widespread existence of fully family owned businesses and businesses with significant 
residual family ownership, the results in the literature relating such corporate ownership structures 
with firm performance appear mixed overall. In particular, a large swathe of prior research has 
investigated contextual factors in the family firm environment such as focusing on family firms in 
a particular geographic area (Claessens, et al., 2000; King & Santor, 2008; Silva & Majluf, 2008), 
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control, board representation, and activity of founding family members (Andres, 2008; Lee, 2006; 
Miller et al., 2007; Minichilli, Corbetta, & MacMillan, 2010), or the potential of conflicts of 
interests among family owners and other ownership groups (Anderson & Reed, 2003).   
 
In terms of the potential benefits of family ownership, prior literature suggests that large, 
concentrated ownership stakes by founding-families can have certain performance advantages: the 
unique position that a founding family occupies in the firm makes it easier to influence and monitor 
management (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985), thus lowering agency costs (Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 
2004), and potentially providing a competitive advantage in product and financial markets. The 
benefits of family ownership occur as the founding family usually has invested most of their 
private wealth in the company, and therefore have vested interest in the survival of the firm and 
thus a strong incentive to monitor management closely (Andres, 2008). Furthermore, families may 
have an advantage in possessing knowledge accumulated over the length of their involvement with 
the firm about firm and market-specific technologies, essential to better monitoring managerial 
actions. The long-term nature of family ownership also fosters better ties with internal and external 
stakeholders such as employees, suppliers, and financial institutions (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; 
Ward, 1988), as the family’s commitment to the firm is perceived as decreasing the conflicts 
among the family and non-family shareholders as well as other stakeholders.   
 
The literature on the costs of family ownership is equally well developed. Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986) suggest that family owners may choose to draw scarce 
company resources away from potentially profitable projects and seek to extract private benefits 
from the firm, as the interests of the family are not necessarily in line with those of other 
shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983). This is due to the entrenchment of family owners, which 
may incentivize them to exchange profits for private rents and result in the expropriation of other 
shareholders (Faccio & Lang, 2002). Furthermore, families may limit the availability of executive 
management positions to family members (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985), thus potentially restricting the 
quality of the labor pool available, leading to competitive disadvantages vis-à-vis non-family 
industry rivals (Anderson & Reeb, 2003), and subsequent underperformance in accounting and 
stock market performance. In some cases, the family members may continue their involvement in 
the firm even when they are no longer competent (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), which may result in 
one of the largest agency costs which family members can impose on other stakeholders in the 
firm. In summary, prior literature on the disadvantages of family ownership suggests that 
ownership costs appear large and significant, as families seek to benefit themselves at the expense 
of other shareholders, via actions that may lead to suboptimal managerial policies, expropriation, 
and overall increased agency costs. Taken together, the firm performance implication of 
substantial family influence in public firms is still an open empirical question. 
 
Considering founding family influence in publicly traded companies through the lens of agency 
theory suggests that in order to more fully understand the impact of this corporate ownership 
structure on firm performance, the indirect effects of corporate strategic investments in value 
creation (R&D) and value appropriation (advertising) activities (Mizik & Jacobson, 2003) must be 
considered, as the mechanism of their impact in family firms may differ. The need to further 
investigate such firm activities is underscored by the scant attention they have received in family 
business research (Gallucci et al., 2015; Reuber & Fischer, 2011), and the differences between 
family and non-family influenced businesses in the realm of strategic decision making (Moores, 
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2009), which makes the former more likely to pursue strategies different from those undertaken in 
non-family businesses contexts (Kotey, 2005).  
 
R&D investments drive a firm’s technological capabilities, which result in value creation, while 
its advertising attempts to differentiate its offering from the competition, and thus appropriate as 
much of the value created for the benefit of the firm as possible (Mizik & Jacobson, 2003). 
Investments in R&D generate superior products and process improvements, as the firms attempt 
to build new solutions and meet customers’ needs (Gatignon & Xuereb, 1997). However, in order 
to capture at least some of the value it creates, the firm must use various isolating mechanisms in 
order to differentiate itself from the competition, such as customer loyalty or a strong brand (Aaker, 
1996), which can be partially achieved by sustained advertising investments (Bunch & Smiley, 
1992). Indeed, advertising has been attributed with building and sustaining a firm’s competitive 
advantage and market share leadership in product markets (Golder, 2000). Furthermore, 
communicating the differentiated value added created by product innovation processes (R&D) 
yields higher firm value effects of such innovations (Srinivasan & Hanssens, 2009), and may act 
as a signal of the firm’s financial well-being or competitive viability (Mathur & Mathur, 2000; 
Mathur, Mathur, & Rangan, 1997).  
 
Founding family influence is associated with increased incentives and ability by the family to 
monitor company management, as large proportion of those families’ personal wealth is usually 
tied to their firm’s welfare and they are less diversified than other shareholders (Colli, 2003). 
Furthermore, as monitoring and control over management may require extensive knowledge about 
firm operations, technology, and marketing, as well as specialized industry knowledge, families 
have a good vantage point to provide such oversight, due to their long ownership horizon, 
permitting the development of such knowledge. The long-term presence of family owners also 
provides longer investment horizons (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006) than those of any other 
shareholder group, supporting the potential for a preference for long-term value generating 
projects, compared to the more short-term managerial horizons in most public firms (Stein, 1988), 
or at least decreasing the pressure for achieving short-term performance targets.  Further evidence 
shows that family ownership incentivizes management to undertake more efficient investment 
projects and may minimize managerial opportunism (Stein, 1999), as the family usually intends to 
pass on the firm to the next generation (James, 1999) and thus tries to preserve and enhance its 
value. Overall, agency theorists suggest that family involvement in public firms may decrease 
agency costs (Chrisman et al., 2004; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) directly through monitoring 
activities and indirectly through influencing managerial action in the domain of value creation and 
appropriation activities via longer investment horizons. 
 
Family firms’ value creation and value appropriation decisions may benefit from the extended time 
horizons of ownership (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006) and result in an increased firm 
performance for a number of reasons. First, the long-time horizon of ownership and specialized 
knowledge that founding families acquire over their tenure with the firm (Anderson & Reeb, 2003) 
allow them to better judge which R&D investments are more likely to result in creating value for 
customers, and therefore should be pursued, and subsequently supported with the proper 
investments in value appropriating mechanisms (i.e. advertising) in order to capture some of the 
value created in the system. Thus, the impact of family ownership monitoring incentives, 
combined with families’ specialized knowledge of the firm and industry, may result in shifting the 
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balance between these activities closer to what is optimal for the firm, and should result in an 
increased performance, compared to non-family firms. Second, sustained benefits from 
investments in innovation and marketing tend to accrue over the long term (Srinivasan & 
Hanssens, 2009) as such activities contribute to building market-based assets (Hunt & Morgan, 
1995; Srivastava et al., 1998) such as strong brands, customer satisfaction, and customer loyalty. 
Such assets require the leveraging of additional inputs into marketing analysis, such as integrating 
marketplace and firm knowledge with a clear understanding of the financial consequences of 
investment decisions. In essence, to achieve positive results from its stock of market-based assets 
built up through sustained investments into value creation and value appropriation activities, the 
firm shifts its attention from managing customer exchanges in product markets, to managing such 
assets, to deliver value for the long-term benefit of its shareholders (Srivastava et al., 1998), 
including the founding family. In family firms, this shift is likely to occur due to the family’s 
superior knowledge of the firm and industry, combined with its long-term investment horizon 
(Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006) and monitoring skills, which are likely to result in decreased 
agency costs. Consequently, the family firm’s performance on accounting and stock market 
performance metrics is likely to be higher than that of non-family firms due to the more efficient 
and effective use of value generation and value appropriation capabilities to produce and leverage 
market-based assets.   
 
Therefore, it is likely that investments in value creation (R&D) and value appropriation 
(advertising) activities moderate the founding-family ownership – firm performance link: 
 
Hypothesis 1.  (A) R&D and (B) advertising investments positively moderate the relationship 
between founding family ownership and firm accounting and financial performance (ROA and 
BHAR). 
 
Figure1 provides a visual representation of the research model.  
 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual model 
 
Methods 
This section presents the methods used to test the hypotheses. The main hypotheses are tested 
using two different quantitative methods, with data on companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges. 
The dataset is structured as a panel (i.e. cross-sectional time-series longitudinal data for the period 
2001-2010).  
 
Data Collection and Sample 
Following Anderson, Duru and Reeb (2009) and Anderson, Reeb and Zhao (2012) the data sample 
is constructed as follows; First, family ownership data for all firms in COMPUSTAT with 
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available data for the period between 2001 and 2010 and excluding regulated utilities, financial 
firms, foreign firms, master limited partnerships, and firms with share prices of less than $0.25 is 
obtained. Second, the sample is restricted to the 2,000 largest firms based on total assets for data-
year 2001. Next, an established and previously validated framework for measuring family 
ownership (Anderson & Reeb, 2003) is utilized to compute the fractional equity ownership of the 
founding family and to identify family firms. The data is available through corporate histories 
(Gale Business Resources, Hoovers, and individual corporate websites), as well as through SEC 
10-K company filings. Following prior research, an indicator variable equal to 1 is used if the 
family holds or votes a 5% or larger ownership stake in the company (Anderson et al., 2009). This 
measure is more suitable than the raw ownership percentage of family holdings, as the differences 
in ownership levels among family firms may not represent the actual influence a particular family 
may have on the firm (i.e. an equity stake of 2% may have a larger impact than one of 12%, 
depending on the ownership control structure and share classes). To control for potential 
survivorship bias in the data, firms are allowed to exit and re-enter the sample during each period. 
Following these procedures, the family ownership data is merged with data for all other variables 
of interest in the study, resulting in 9,995 firm-year observations for both family and non-family 
firms.  
 
Of the total 2000 firms in the sample, there are 464 unique family firms, which are on average 
slightly older than non-family firms (9 years compared to 8 years since going public), and are 
present in 53 of the 65 industries in the dataset based on two-digit SIC codes. The top five 
industries in which such firms operated were business services (SIC code 73), apparel and 
accessory stores (SIC code 56), food and kindred products manufacturing (SIC code 20), 
communications (SIC code 48), and chemical and allied products manufacturing (SIC code 28), 
and all of their headquarters were located in the U.S. The data for all additional variables comes 
from the COMPUSTAT and CRSP databases. Table 1 lists all variables, their correlations, and 
descriptive statistics.  
 
Variables 
Firm performance is measured by using accounting return on assets (ROA) (Arosa, Iturralde, & 
Maseda, 2010) and Buy-and-Hold-Abnormal-Returns (BHAR). These two dependent variables are 
suitable to the context under investigation, as the focus of the paper is on family-owned firms 
which are also publicly traded, thus the impact of family involvement is likely to be captured in 
both accounting (ROA) and stock market measures of performance (BHAR). ROA is computed as 
earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) divided by the book value 
of total assets. To estimate the second measure of firm performance, buy and hold abnormal returns 
(Daniel & Titman, 1997) are calculated; this model compares the actual returns of a portfolio of 
firms with those of a hypothetical benchmark portfolio of stocks that belong to the same size, book-
to-market, and momentum quintiles as the stock of the firm under investigation. Specifically, 
BHAR is computed using the following method: 
  
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑚,𝑡) −  ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑗(𝑖,𝑚,𝑡)) ,      (1) 
 
where t is the fiscal year; m is the month within each year; Ri,m,t  is the return of the specific firm 
i in month m of year t; and R j(i,m,t) is the return of the control portfolio j which includes all stocks 
of the same size, book-to-market, and momentum quintiles as firm i at the beginning of month m 
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of year t. In essence, the buy and hold returns approach reflects the abnormal return that an investor 
would be able to earn from holding a stock for an extended period, using compounded interest, 
and is therefore preferred for studies which require testing firm performance over longer time 
horizons (Barber & Lyon, 1997), which is likely to be the case with family owned firms, especially 
when the impact of strategic actions needs to be taken into account.   
 
The main independent variables of interest are family ownership in publicly traded firms, 
advertising and R&D investments. Advertising and R&D investments are two of the main 
corporate level strategies used in all businesses to generate and appropriate value. Advertising 
investment is measured as intensity: the amount spent on advertising in a given year, divided by 
the book value of firm total assets, in order to control for firm size effects, as larger companies 
tend to advertise more. R&D investment is measured in a similar manner: R&D spending scaled 
by the book value of firm total assets, based on data from the COMPUSTAT annual data file. 
 
Controls are implemented for firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of the total firm assets 
(Olson et al., 2003),  level of financial leverage of the firm, as the debt to equity ratio (Cheng, 
2009), and ownership by other large outside institutional investors (holding at least 5% equity 
stake in a company in a given year), as those organizations may have an outsize influence over 
managerial decision making through monitoring and disciplining actions Schleifer and Vishny 
(1997), in addition to, or over and above, the effects of founding family ownership, which may 
mask the true nature of family involvement in publicly traded firms, when such entities are present 
in the ownership structure. To test the moderating effects of advertising and R&D investments, the 
interaction variables are calculated as the products of the independent variables, resulting in two 
different moderators: (founding family ownership) × (advertising investment), and (founding 
family ownership) × (R&D investment).  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
Variable 
 
Mean 
St. 
Dev ROA BHAR 
Family 
Firm ADVG R&D Size Leverage 
Inst. 
Own 
ROA .1058 .45 1        
BHAR -.1198 .63 .0096 1       
Family Firm .2914 .45 .0117 .0138 1      
Advertising .0116 .04 .0172 -.0121 .0634 1     
R&D  .0313 .18 -.7592 .0035 -.1148 .0043 1    
Size 6.8716 2.25 .0738 .0062 -.1422 -.0945 -.1797 1   
Leverage .5075 .42 -.0085 -.0755 -.0309 -.0421 -.0498 .1024 1  
Institutional 
ownership 
 
.3844 
 
.36 .0483 .0496 -.1380 -.0140 -.0299 .2717 -0.3140 1 
Note: Entries in bold indicate significant correlation coefficients 
 
The impact of marketing and innovation investments on the relationship between founding family 
influence and the two measures of firm performance (ROA) and (BHAR) is modeled by 
implementing a moderated multiple regression (Aguinis, Gottfredson, & Wright, 2011) using 
panel data, with fixed effects and controls for time and industry effects. The use of cross-sectional 
fixed effects is desirable in this setting, as it relaxes the strict exogeneity assumption for the 
regressors and is preferable to other methods (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009), as the main independent 
variables and controls are not time-invariant (Wooldridge, 2010).  
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𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =  β0 + β1𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 + β2𝑋𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + β3𝑅𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + β4𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑋𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡  +
β5𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑅𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡  + β6𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡  + β7𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + β8𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡  + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡,   (2) 
 
where ROAi,t = Return on Assets for firm i at time t, 
 FamilyFirmi,t = dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i at time t is a family firm,  
 XADi,t = Advertising intensity for firm i at time t, 
RNDi,t = R&D intensity for firm i at time t 
 INSTi,t = All institutional holdings (percentage) in firm i at time t, 
 LEVi,t = Degree of indebtedness (leverage ratio) of firm i at time t, 
 SIZEi,t = size of firm i at time t, measured as the log of firm assets. 
 
The same modeling approach is used to estimate the regression for the stock market return variable 
of interest (BHAR), substituting BHARi,t for ROAi,t in equation (2). Furthermore, all independent 
variables are mean-centered in order to test the moderating effects and to avoid collinearity issues 
(Aguinis et al., 2011; Aiken, West, & Reno, 1991). Next, the two separate regression models for 
each dependent variable are tested in turn: first testing only the main effects of the explanatory and 
control variables (Model 1), and second, the explanatory variables, controls, and interaction terms 
(Model 2).  
 
It is possible that there are endogeneity concerns in the context of publicly traded firms with family 
ownership as their performance may lead to higher investments in advertising and R&D activities 
compared to non-family firms, resulting in reverse causality (i.e. firm performance leading to 
increased advertising and R&D investments). In order to address some of those concerns and to 
check for the robustness of the results from the model in equation (2), the Blundell-Bond system 
generalized method of moments (GMM) approach is used (Blundell & Bond, 1998); this approach 
has been employed by prior studies when external instrumental variables were not a feasible option 
(e.g., Rego, Morgan, & Fornell, 2013; Yoganarasimhan, 2012).  
 
The system GMM approach increases efficiency over the other GMM approaches, such as the 
more popular Arellano-Bond only estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991), by introducing additional 
internal instruments. Variables in levels are instrumented with lags of their own first differences, 
and the only assumption needed is that these differences are uncorrelated with the unobserved firm 
effects (Blundell & Bond, 1998). This estimation approach is suitable for situations in which 
independent variables (family ownership, advertising, and R&D investments) are not strictly 
exogenous (i.e. uncorrelated with past and possibly current realizations of the error term), as well 
as when there is potential for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity within firms (Roodman, 2006). 
 
Findings 
The results from the analyses, performed using STATA 14.0 are presented in this section. Table 1 
shows the descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables and show bivariate 
correlations. Overall, it shows relatively low levels of correlation among independent variables 
and the dependent variables. Next, table 2 presents model-free evidence which supports the mixed 
findings of previous empirical research regarding the direct effects of family firm ownership on 
firm performance: In all but 4 of the sample years, the performance differences in terms of return 
on assets between family and non-family firms were not different from zero (i.e. not statistically 
International Interdisciplinary Business-Economics Advancement Journal 
 74 
significant). However, in the four years which exhibit significant differences between those two 
types of firms, it appears that family firms performed marginally better on average. 
 
Table 2: Average Firm Performance (ROA) of Family vs. Non-Family Firms, t-Tests 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Non-family 
firm .1226 .1175 .1205 .1289 .1373 .1396 .1321 .1342 .1197 .1355 
Family firm .1338 .1261 .1288 .1401 .1431 .1392 .1311 .122 .1073 .1363 
t-test p-value .05a .09a .07a .035 .17 .51 .55 .89 .93 .46 
Note: a Significant at the .10 level (2-tailed); b Significant at the .05 level (2-tailed) 
 
Next, the left panel of table 3 lists the results from equation (2) for the accounting performance 
variable of interest (ROA). The findings suggest that there is no direct effect of founding ownership 
on firm performance on either (ROA) or (BHAR), consistent with prior research. However, the 
results from the moderation analysis suggest that increasing advertising intensity relates to 
increased accounting performance (β4 = .3808, p-value < .01). Furthermore, this is also the case 
for increasing R&D spending (β5 = .00001, p-value < .01). Therefore, there is support for the 
beneficial impact of family ownership structure on the payoffs to advertising and R&D 
investments for accounting performance (ROA), supporting H1.a and H1.b. 
 
Table 3: Impact of Family Ownership, Advertising and R&D, Panel Data Fixed Effects Regressions 
 ROA  BHAR 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Family Firm .0032 .0039 .0387 .0417 
Advertising .2719*** .2940*** -1.6752** -1.6057*** 
R&D -.6867*** -.6888*** -.7310** -.7256** 
Family Firm × Advertising  .3808***  1.6424*** 
Family Firm × R&D  .00001***  .00001 
Institutional Ownership .0151** .0156*** -.0483 -.0467 
Leverage -.1075*** -.1076*** -.3167*** -.3170*** 
Firm Size -.0032* -.0033* -.0869*** -.0869*** 
Number of Observations 9,983 9,983 9,745 9,745 
Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Note: No-Bond GMM Results: Effects of S DIMENSIONS AND EXAMPLESPRODU* p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p 
< .01. 
 
The right panel of table 3 presents the results for the stock market performance variable of interest 
(BHAR). The results are largely consistent with those for accounting performance: increasing 
advertising intensity in family firms is associated with increased firm performance (BHAR) (β4 = 
1.6424, p-value < .01). The results for R&D investments do not approach statistical significance 
in this case, however, thus supporting only H1.b for the stock market firm performance measure. 
In both cases, the findings support the notion of the positive impact of family ownership when 
firms decide to increase their emphasis on value appropriation activities through advertising.   
 
Table 4 presents the results from the first robustness check, using the alternative Blundell-Bond 
system GMM regression model. Using this alternative model, the findings suggest a negative main 
effect of family ownership on firm performance in terms of (ROA) (β1 = -.0376, p-value < .01), 
however, this effect reverses when using a stock market measure of performance (BHAR) (β1 = 
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.3374, p-value < .01), further confirming the mixed nature of results in the empirical literature 
(Astrachan, 2010).   
 
The left panel further presents the results for the return on assets (ROA) model. The findings from 
the moderation analysis suggest that increasing advertising intensity in family influenced firms is 
associated with increased accounting performance (β4 = .7051, p-value < .01). Furthermore, this is 
also the case for increasing R&D intensity (β5 = .0002, p-value < .01). 
 
Table 4: Impact of Family Ownership, Advertising and R&D, Blundell-Bond System GMM Model 
 ROA  BHAR 
Variable Main Model Full Model Main Model Full Model 
Family Firm -.0376*** -.0281***   .3374***   .3914*** 
Advertising .1451***   .1727*** -.8870 -.4310 
R&D -.8647*** -.9128*** -.8006** -.9900*** 
Family Firm × Advertising    .7051***  7.0452** 
Family Firm × R&D    .0002***    .0008* 
Institutional Ownership -.0252*** -.0232***   .0164   .0190 
Leverage -.2457*** -.2429***   .1361*   .2032*** 
Firm Size .0083***   .0033*** -.1919** -.2352*** 
     
Number of Observations 8,188 8,188 8,026 8,026 
Notes: No-Bond GMM Results:Effects of S DIMENSIONS AND EXAMPLESPRODU*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p 
< .10.  
 
The right panel of table 4 presents the results for the stock market performance variable of interest 
(BHAR). The results are consistent with those for accounting performance: family firms seem to 
tolerate higher advertising investments than non-family firms, which benefit their stock market 
performance (β4 = 7.0452, p-value < .05). Furthermore, this is also the case for increasing R&D 
spending (β5 = .0008, p-value < .10). Therefore, the Blundell-Bond System GMM analysis 
provides additional support for the beneficial impact of family ownership structure on the payoffs 
to advertising and R&D investments fully supporting both H1.a and H1b.    
 
Conclusions 
This research attempts to investigate (1) whether family influence in publicly traded firms is 
associated with increased firm performance, and (2) whether increasing investments in value 
creation (R&D) and value appropriation (advertising) activities moderate the relationship. The 
main findings suggest that overall family ownership has no impact on two measures of firm 
performance (ROA and BHAR) as a main effect. In a robustness check, using a different 
methodological approach, the impact of family ownership appears mixed: negative for accounting 
performance, and positive for stock market performance. These results confirm prior evidence 
suggesting mixed findings in the empirical literature in family business research linking this 
ownership structure with firm performance (Astrachan, 2010). 
 
However, family firms which also emphasize investments in value-creating and value-
appropriating activities such as R&D and advertising have higher return on assets (ROA) and stock 
market performance (BHARs) than their non-family competitors. This second set of findings 
suggests that family influence in public firms is associated with higher firm performance vis-à-vis 
non-family firms, even after the family owners have diluted their ownership stake after the IPO 
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stage, however, only when these firms invest in R&D and advertising activities. The increase in 
ROA is likely linked to the growth of earnings, as family firms seem to be able to utilize advertising 
and R&D investments more efficiently on a dollar for dollar basis, compared to non-family owned 
firms. This is because family firms which focus on such isolating mechanisms are likely benefiting 
from the long-time horizon of ownership of the family (Miller & Le-Breton-Miller, 2006) which 
has been associated with a willingness to commit resources toward the ultimate success of the 
business (James, 1999; Laverty, 1996). Long horizon oriented investments are a necessary 
condition for the development of market-based assets (Srivastava et al., 1998) such as strong 
brands, customer loyalty, and customer satisfaction, which in turn are associated with sustainable 
increases in firm performance over the long-term, and thus represent one of the key differentiating 
factors between family and non-family firms.  
 
The findings are further strengthened by the large sample size and the longitudinal nature of the 
data, the control for survivorship bias, as well as the 53 distinct industries featuring family firms 
included in the study, which allows for context-free generalization of the results. Furthermore, the 
study context allows for using different dependent variables, and underscores the importance of 
investigating multiple performance measures in studying family businesses, as one of the 
shortcomings of prior research has been determining the suitability of performance metrics 
(Astrachan, 2010) in family business research.    
 
Through the lens of agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989) these findings support the assertion that the 
reduction in agency costs attributed to founding family ownership in public firms is beneficial to 
increased firm performance, as it allows for better monitoring of management by influential family 
owners, interested in the long-term survival and viability of the firm. However, the reduction in 
agency costs appears a necessary, but not sufficient condition for increased performance to occur: 
this study supports the notion that that the reduction in agency costs is beneficial only when 
combined with an environment conducive to fostering long-term investments in value generation 
and value appropriation activities, which in turn seem to differentiate the family firm from non-
family competitors and act as an isolating mechanism, contributing to accounting and stock market 
outperformance. Moreover, the findings support the mechanisms through which family 
involvement manifests in increased firm performance, and uncover one of the possible strategic 
reasons for the existence of a de-facto family ownership premium in U.S. publicly traded firms 
with residual family ownership.    
 
The findings suggest that increasing R&D and advertising investments in the context of family 
firms act as a long-term, sustained corporate strategic policy and have positive implications for 
firm performance, and therefore offer compelling suggestions for executives, managers, investors 
and other stakeholders of such firms. First, managers of family influenced firms should be able to 
better support their R&D and advertising budgeting requests for investments in projects with 
longer-term payoff projections. Due to the unique corporate structure, and the decrease in agency 
costs in family firms, management is positioned to take advantage of such investments, as the 
family ownership may offer a degree of protection from pressures for short-term performance by 
outside factors. Second, upper level management and executives may benefit by utilizing the 
findings in this research to decrease outside pressures on their firms for short-term performance at 
the expense of sacrificing long-term value creating investments in R&D and certain advertising 
initiatives (i.e. investing in brand building, customer satisfaction and loyalty campaigns). This 
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effect could be accomplished by emphasizing the benefits of the family’s influence in the firm: the 
deep knowledge of the firm and the industry overall, coupled with the increased monitoring of 
management may prevent myopic decisions in the domain of value creation and value 
appropriation in the domain of strategy setting and execution. Third, investors in family influenced 
public firms may also benefit by adopting a longer-term perspective on their holdings of 
advertising and R&D intensive family firms. In essence, their return on investment should increase 
due to the family ownership premium identified in this research, as such longer-term investment 
perspective matches with the time horizon of strategic managerial decisions taken inside the family 
firm.     
 
Previous studies have suggested that founding family ownership as a corporate structure is plagued 
with issues of nepotism, entrenchment, and exploitation of minority shareholders which ultimately 
would lead to lower performance (Miller et al., 2007) as it imposes a relatively high agency cost 
on other shareholders. Contrary to such previous findings, the current set of results suggests that 
founding family ownership represents a positive influence on public firms on average; the role of 
the founding family as an influential stockholder emerges as a monitoring and control mechanism 
which can influence managerial decision making by encouraging a long-term orientation, which 
is in turn conducive to fostering long-term growth oriented investments, resulting in increasing 
firm performance. However, the results do not suggest that family influence leads directly to higher 
investments in R&D and advertising activities, as this study did not conduct a mediation analysis; 
therefore, this is one of the limitations of the current research. Yet, there is some prior evidence to 
suggest that family firms tend to be associated with higher investments in R&D than non-family 
firms (Weber, Lavelle, Lowry, Zellner, & Barrett, 2003), which may provide some support for this 
argument and buttress the research findings in the current study.  
 
Other limitations (and opportunities for further research) stem from discovering the exact 
mechanisms via which founding family ownership influences marketing and innovation 
investments and strategies. Furthermore, investigating this study’s implications in the context of 
non-publicly traded family firms and in international contexts would add additional insight to our 
understanding of whether the mechanisms supporting value creation and value appropriation are 
similar, as this study relies on data for relatively large, publicly listed firms on U.S. stock 
exchanges. Such businesses may differ significantly from non-exchange listed family firms, and 
thus may impact the nature of the payoffs to advertising and R&D investments. Therefore, some 
additional future research directions would be to investigate the treatment of these strategic 
investments under various family-ownership scenarios such as studying their implications for 
long-term survival of the firm, building competitive capabilities, internationalization, family 
succession and family dynamics issues, and changes in ownership or control.    
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